The use of armed drones for counter-terrorism purposes: whether customary international law? by Kleinberga, Anete
 
 
 
 
 
The Use of Armed Drones for Counter-Terrorism 
Purposes: Whether Customary International Law? 
 
MASTER’S  THESIS 
 
 
AUTHOR:     Anete Kleinberga  
     LL.M 2018/2019 year student 
     student number M016043 
 
 
SUPERVISOR:   KUSHTRIM ISTREFI 
    Dr.iur. 
      
 
 
DECLARATION OF HONOUR: 
I declare that this thesis is my own work, and that all references to, or quotations 
from, the work of others are fully and correctly cited. 
 
(Signed) …………………………………. 
        
       /Anete Kleinberga/ 
 
RIGA, 2019 
2 
 
ABSTRACT 
 The vast and rapid development of technologies constantly creates gaps in the law 
within both the international and national law systems. One of such technologies the increased 
usage of which for military purposes has instituted a debate on the applicable law for its use 
under the existing legal frameworks is the technology of armed drones, also known as armed 
unmanned aerial vehicles (AUAVs). The source of the debate is the presumption that armed 
drones are almost exclusively used for counter-terrorism purposes, thus involving their use 
against non-state actors operating in a country that a state is not in war with. The author of 
this thesis will, first of all, identify the established legal framework regulating the use of 
armed drones in order to identify the gaps in the existing law. Following that the author will 
further focus the research on the possible emergence of a customary international law on the 
use of armed drones for counter-terrorism purposes. In order to reach the final conclusion 
about their legality, with a focus on the possibility to determine the emergence of a customary 
international law, the author will aim at determining existing practices and opinio juris 
regarding their use.  
 
Keywords: armed drones; customary international law; state practice; opinio juris; targeted 
killing; counter-terrorism; legal validity; non-international armed conflict; fight against non-
state actors.  
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SUMMARY 
The debate surrounding the use of armed drones under international law suggests that for 
proper legal assessment on their legality one should analyse their use with reference to ius ad 
bellum, i.e. the law governing the resort to the use of force (whether and when), as well as 
with reference to the international humanitarian law (IHL; how force can be used) and 
international human rights law (IHRL).1 It is suggested that the non-compliance with any of 
the laws or principles determined by these three different legal regimes of international law in 
relation to the use of armed drones result in a legal invalidity of their use. It means that for 
example compliance with ius ad bellum and the non-compliance with international 
humanitarian law results in the breach of the international law governing the use of armed 
drones.2 
In order to provide a brief insight into the subject of military technologies that may 
add to the understanding of the subject of the use of armed drones in general, the author 
would like to, first of all, distinguish between the different types of drones that are commonly 
used in practice by military. The author sees it as relevant in order to stress the difference 
between the military drones and the civil drones, and to underline the importance of 
technological developments that may affect the emergence of new military attack methods. 
Afterwards the author would like to emphasize the two basic purposes for which armed 
drones can be used, i.e. in wartime and in the fight against terrorism. Once these two types of 
usages have been highlighted, the discussion may further evolve around the use of armed 
drones in the fight against terrorism as the most controversial of the subjects causing debates 
of international and domestic scope due to which the author has chosen to focus the research 
on the subject of use of armed drones for counter-terrorism purposes. 
Following the first part of the research which aims at providing a short insight into 
what distinguishes armed drones from other military means, stressing the main characteristics 
and also tries to answer what are the main ethical issues surrounding the debate on the use of 
armed drones, the author in the second part of this research chooses to discuss the established 
international legal framework regulating the use of armed drones. Within the scope of this 
research the use of armed drones is discussed separately under ius ad bellum, international 
humanitarian law and international human rights law, as well as under several multilateral 
frameworks, providing for a varying degree of certainty. The reason why the author chooses 
to discuss the existing international legal framework for regulating the use of armed drones 
disregarding the fact that the research question if focused on the possibility to determine the 
emergence of a new international customary law regarding the use of armed drones, is 
because, in view of the author, codified law helps to better understand the framework which 
applies to the specific case of the use of armed drones and define the circumstances under 
which the necessity of establishing a particular international customary rule may arise.  
                                                
1 Christof Heyns, Dapo Akande, Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, Thompson Chengeta, “The International Law 
Framework Regulating the Use of Armed Drones” International & Comparative Law Quarterly Vol 65, Issue 4 
(2016): p. 791, accessed March 13, 2018. doi:10.1017/S0020589316000385. See also United Nations. Study on 
Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Prepared on the Recommendation of the Advisory Board on Disarmament 
Matters, p. vii. Available on: https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/assets/publications/more/drones-study/drones-study.pdf. Accessed May 15, 2019. 
2 Heyns, Akande, Hill-Cawthorne and Chengeta, “Use of Armed Drones”, p. 791. 
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Even more, in view of the author the lack of proper regulations that are detailed 
enough to be relied upon as a guidance for the usages of advanced technologies, including 
military ones, may turn into a stumbling block for their continuous development which shall 
primarily serve for the purposes of the defence. From the one hand the technological 
development of armed drones is welcomed and should be precipitated, taking into account the 
fact that armed drones are not only seen as providing military advantage3, but have the added 
value of being capable to perform a targeted attack with a minimum risk to cause incidental 
loss to the civilian population and civilian objects, thereby facilitating the compliance with 
international law. Thus, they provide a protection to the civilian population through the 
advancement of military capabilities. On the other hand the development of armed drones has 
raised concerns over the criteria under which the choice to target a certain individual or object 
is made and in what types of situations they can be used, i.e. in wartime or in fight against 
terrorism, within the zones of conflict and also outside these zones.4  
Forasmuch one would assume that the precision of an attack, that can be guaranteed 
by the use of armed drones in juxtaposition to the armed attack on the ground per se justifies 
their usage in areas where the civilian population or civilian objects might be affected, such 
authorization may not be legitimate under the law, both international and domestic. At the 
same time the technological development as such can shape the development of law. If not in 
the form of codified law, then at least by establishing a new international customary law on 
the basis of state practices and opinio juris.5 With this in mind, the third part of this research 
focuses on discussing the elements to be taken account when determining the emergence or 
existence of an international customary law. The main elements for determining a new 
customary law are state practice and opinio juris. The author will focus separately on the role 
of United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions as a source of opinio juris in 
response to practices already introduced by states, as well as the accelerated formation of a 
new international customary law discussing the circumstances under which the determination 
of accelerated emergence of a new customary law is possible or has been possible throughout 
the history of international law. 
With the help of the research the author sees the possibility to disentangle the subjects 
surrounding the debate on the legality of use of armed drones and to come to the conclusion 
on the main controversies that might impede or accelerate the emergence of a customary 
international law on their use for counter-terrorism purposes. At best the author would like to 
come to the conclusion that on the basis of the existing states practices and opinio juris it can 
be established that a new international customary law, which authorizes the use of a distinct 
type of warfare, e.g. armed drones, for anti-terrorism purposes against non-state actors in 
another state’s territory has emerged. In case such a conclusion could not be reached, it would 
be necessary to identify some of the objective factors that are impeding the emergence of the 
particular rule.  
                                                
3 Delphine Hayim, “From Just War to Clean War: The Impact of Modern Technology on Military Ethics”, in 
Legitimacy and Drones: Investigating the Legality, Morality and Efficacy of UCAVs, ed.  Steven J. 
Barela  (London: Routledge, 2015), p. 191.  
4 United Nations. Study on Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Prepared on the Recommendation of the Advisory 
Board on Disarmament Matters, p. viii. Available on: https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/assets/publications/more/drones-study/drones-study.pdf. Accessed May 15, 2019. 
5 Michael P. Scharf, “Seizing the “Grotian Moment”: Accelerated Formation of Customary International Law in 
Times of Fundamental Change”, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 43, p. 450. Available on: 
https://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/ILJ/upload/Scharf.pdf. Accessed April 7, 2019. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The use of armed drones by military sector of the United States (US) has gradually increased 
since the 9/11 attacks,6 as an alternative to traditional weaponry, thus providing maximum 
precision for the purpose of targeted killings with an aim to defeat terrorist organizations, i.e. 
for counter-terrorism purposes. In the case of US the use of armed drones has taken place 
against non-state actors in another states territory, thus challenging their legitimacy. At the 
same time, since 2001 the use of armed drones has increased also by the United Kingdom 
(UK), Israel and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) within the scope of inter-state 
conflicts, as well as emerged in Pakistan, Iraq, Nigeria and possibly elsewhere within the 
scope of non-international conflicts.7 The territorially wide application of armed drones raises 
the discussion of the legitimacy of their usage, mostly within the scope of counter-terrorism 
operations, but not limited to such operations. Moreover, concerns on threat to the global 
security that the lack of regulation on the use of armed drones and counter-terrorism methods 
in general may cause, have been raised by the international community.8   
This research will, firstly, briefly discuss the military advantage of the use of armed 
drones aiming at stressing what distinguishes armed drones from other military means, 
starting with identifying different types of drones. The author will further distinguish between 
the use of armed drones in wartime and in the fight against terrorism. This is necessary to 
stress the main differences in their use for these two purposes and subsequently assessing the 
validity of each separately. Last but not least, the author in the first section will also pay 
attention to the aspect of ethics of the use of armed drones that should be taken into account 
as a separate element of the analysis adding to the discussion on their legitimacy.9 The first 
section in general shall aim to uncover the reasons behind the selection of the research 
subject. 
Secondly, the author will discuss the existing international legal framework regulating 
the use of armed drones by focusing on the ius ad bellum or the use of force law, as well as 
international humanitarian law and international human rights law. The discussion of the use 
of armed drones within the said legal framework shall subsequently lead to defining the main 
legal obstacles in ascertaining the validity of their use. The determination of obstacles shall 
                                                
6 Avery Plaw, Matthew S. Fricker, Carlos R. Colon, “The Debate over Legality: Are Drone Strikes Permissible 
under U.S. and International Law?”, in The Drone Debate: A Primer on the U.S. use of unmanned aircraft 
outside conventional battlefields, Avery Plaw et al. (London: Rowman&Littlefield, 2016), pp. 111, 113-116. 
7 Heyns, Akande, Hill-Cawthorne and Chengeta, “Use of Armed Drones”, p. 792. See also United Nations 
General Assembly. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, A/68/389, paras. 25–40. Available on: 
https://undocs.org/en/A/68/389. Accessed May 15, 2019. See also Fortune, Clay Dillow, “All of These Countries 
Now Have Armed Drones”, February 12, 2016. Available on: http://fortune.com/2016/02/12/these-countries- 
have-armed-drones. Accessed April 11, 2018. 
8 David Cortright and Rachel Fairhurst, “Assessing the Debate on Drone Warfare”, in Drones and the Future of 
Armed Conflict, ed. David Cortright, et al. (London: The University of Chicago Press, 2015), p. 6. See also 
United Nations Human Rights Council. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Ben Emmerson, A/HRC/25/29 (11 March 
2014), “Achieving a consensus on the applicable legal principles”, p. 18. Available on: https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G14/119/49/PDF/G1411949.pdf?OpenElement. Accessed May 1, 2018. 
9 A model of viewing the subject of armed drones from the perspective of legitimacy, morality and efficacy is 
provided in the following source: Steven J. Barela, “Creating a Drone Court: Integration via a Policy Proposal”, 
in  Legitimacy and Drones: Investigating the Legality, Morality and Efficacy of UCAVs, Ed. Steven J Bare 
Routledge: London, New York, 2016). 
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contribute to the understanding of the main gaps in the law as well as the subjects on which 
there is lack of case law or opinio juris in general, that might hinder the interpretation of the 
issue of the use of armed drones for counter terrorism.   
Thirdly, this research will further provide a discussion on possibility of emergence of 
customary international law on the use of armed drones for targeted killings of non-state 
actors in another states territory. In order to find the answer the author will briefly analyse the 
objective element, i.e. state practice and the objective element, i.e. opinio juris, taken into 
consideration in the formation of international customary law, the possibility of accelerated 
formation of such a law and the role of UNGA resolutions in determining the emergence or 
existence of a new international customary norm.  
Fourthly, this research shall provide an analysis of the existing practices against non-
state actors of the states which are known to have used armed drones for counter-terrorism 
purposes, i.e. US and UK. Following a description of such practices the author will focus the 
analysis on the available opinio juris and the responses from the international community 
regarding practices of each state separately. 
Finally, this research shall aim at reaching conclusion on the legality of the use of 
armed drones for counter-terrorism purposes with the focus on situations in which the attacks 
are carried out against non-state actors in another states territory and outside of the conflict 
zone.10 This conclusion shall be reached on the basis of the analysis on the possibility of 
determining the emergence or existence of a customary international law permitting drone 
strikes with reference to state practice and opinio juris. To reach the final conclusion the 
author will simultaneously take into account the framework provided by international codified 
law on the legality of the use of armed drones as a reference point in case of controversies or 
lack of relevant practices or opinio juris.  
Research question: Whether on the basis of the existing practice and opinio juris there can 
be identified the formation of a customary international law which authorizes the use of a 
distinct type of warfare, e.g. armed drones, for anti-terrorism purposes against non-state actors 
in another states territory? 
Hypothesis: On the basis of the existing practice (usus) and opinio juris (necessitatis) it can 
be established that the use of armed drones for anti-terrorism purposes has emerged into a 
customary rule. 
 
 
 
  
                                                
10 United Nations. Study on Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Prepared on the Recommendation of the Advisory 
Board on Disarmament Matters, p. ix. Available on: https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/assets/publications/more/drones-study/drones-study.pdf. Accessed May 15, 2019. 
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THE MILITARY ADVANTAGE OF THE USE OF ARMED DRONES: WHAT 
DISTINGUISHES ARMED DRONES FROM OTHER MILITARY MEANS? 
 
Before entering into further discussion aiming at demonstrating the military advantage of 
armed drones, the author would like to, first of all, distinguish between armed drones and 
unarmed drones. Unarmed drones used both for civilian and military purposes are designated 
as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or Remotely Piloted Aircrafts (RPAs)11, whereas 
armed drones, supposedly used only for military purposes, are generally referred to as Armed 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (AUAVs)12 or Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs)13. 
However, two other overarching designations for armed drones used for military purposes 
have been developed: unmanned combat aircraft and unmanned attack helicopter.14 According 
to the definitions provided during the 68th session of the UNGA unmanned combat aircraft is: 
[m]anned fixed-wing or variable-geometry wing aircraft, designed, equipped or modified to 
engage targets by employing guided missiles, unguided rockets, bombs, guns, cannons or other 
weapons of destruction, including versions of these aircraft which perform specialized electronic 
warfare, suppression of air defence or reconnaissance missions.15 	  
Whereas the definition of unmanned attack helicopter provides the following:	  
[u]nmanned fixed-wing or variable-geometry wing aircraft, designed, equipped or modified to 
engage targets by employing guided missiles, unguided rockets, bombs, guns, cannons or other 
weapons of destruction.16 
To continue, by focusing on more detailed distinction, according to the Study on Armed 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles17, drones are commonly categorized by their weight, endurance 
and operating range.18 Hence, they can be divided  on the basis of their size as small, medium 
and large drones. From these the small drones with the maximum take-off weight of 150 kg 
flying in the altitude of maximum 150 m (~500feet)19 within the visual line-of-sight20 are 
                                                
11 Lindsay C. Warrior, “Drones and Targeted Killing: Costs, Accountability, and U.S. Civil-Military 
Relations,” Orbis 59, no. 1 (2015): p. 96, doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2014.11.008.  
12 United Nations. Study on Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Prepared on the Recommendation of the Advisory 
Board on Disarmament Matters. Available on: https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/assets/publications/more/drones-study/drones-study.pdf. Accessed May 15, 2019. 
13 Lindsay C. Warrior, “Drones and Targeted Killing”, p. 96.  
14 United Nations. Study on Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Prepared on the Recommendation of the Advisory 
Board on Disarmament Matters, p. 9. Available on: https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/assets/publications/more/drones-study/drones-study.pdf. Accessed May 15, 2019. 
See also United Nations General Assembly. Sixty-eight session of the General Assembly. General and complete 
disarmament: transparency in armaments, Continuing operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional 
Arms and its further development, p. 17, para. 45. Available on: 
https://www.un.org/depts/ddar/Register/Resolutions/5070.htm.  Accessed April 1, 2018. 
15 United Nations General Assembly. Sixty-eight session of the General Assembly. General and complete 
disarmament: transparency in armaments, Continuing operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional 
Arms and its further development, p. 17, para. 45. Available on: 
https://www.un.org/depts/ddar/Register/Resolutions/5070.htm. Accessed April 1, 2018. 
16 Ibid. 
17 United Nations. Study on Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Prepared on the Recommendation of the Advisory 
Board on Disarmament Matters. Available on: https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/assets/publications/more/drones-study/drones-study.pdf. Accessed May 15, 2019.  
18 Ibid., p. 5. 
19 Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
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most often produced for civil purposes, whereas the military sector uses medium and large 
size drones. The take-off weight of medium size drones is between 150 kg and 600 kg and 
they fly in altitude up to 5,500 m (~18,000 feet) within the radio line-of-sight and are used 
mostly for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance purposes.21 Whereas large drones 
have a high take-off weight above 600 kg, capable of flying in altitude above 5,500 m 
(~18,000 feet) and beyond radio line-of-sight, however they need a runway for take-off and 
landing.22 Large drones are subcategorized into medium altitude (MALE) drones and high 
altitude long endurance (HALE) drones23, from which the MALE UAVs are recognized as 
particularly suitable for launching targeted attacks.24 Those are drones that are capable of 
flying approximately up to 13.500 m (~45,000 feet) high above sea level and loiter for several 
hours. Most well known include systems as MQ-1 Predator, MQ-5 Hunter, MQ-9 Reaper and 
Hermes 900.25  
The categorization of drones is helpful in understanding the purposes for which each 
type of drone could be used as well as the actors by which they would be most commonly 
purchased and used, including the military sector. This relatively subtle division reaches 
beyond the distinction between drones used for either civil or military purposes, and includes 
both armed or unarmed drones. Simultaneously the categorization sheds the light on the 
possibility that some types of armed drones would be more likely to be acquired and misused 
by non-state armed groups than the others, mostly small size drones.26 Therefore, the 
existence of such category of drones illustrates a legal problem from the side of their misuse 
by non-state actors. This is in parallel to the main subject of interest of this research, which is 
the legal validity of the use of armed drones in the fight against terrorism, instead of their use 
by terrorists. Even though their misuse by non-state armed groups will not be further 
discussed in this paper, it is relevant to mention that the fact itself implies the need for equally 
strong legal framework of regulating the use of armed drones, that would be capable to limit 
the misuse of drones by non-state actors. 
Once the categorization has been made it can be clarified that this research shall focus 
only on the use of armed drones by states for military purposes and designed to perform a 
targeted killing. It is equally important to mention that within the scope of this research the 
author will most of the times use the designation “armed drones”, which may cover wide 
variety of armed unmanned aerial vehicles. 
This chapter shall further clarify the main purposes for which armed drones could be 
used and the goals to be achieved with their usage.27 There are mainly two distinct purposes 
for which armed drones are commonly used, i.e. for targeted killing directed against an 
individual or a small group of individuals in the fight against terrorism and in wartime 
directed against a combatant. In this respect it must be further distinguished that targeted 
killings are regulated by the law governing the use of force against individuals, i.e. 
                                                                                                                                                   
20 United Nations. Study on Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Prepared on the Recommendation of the Advisory 
Board on Disarmament Matters, p. 5. Available on: https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/assets/publications/more/drones-study/drones-study.pdf. Accessed May 15, 2019. 
21 Ibid., p. 6.  
22 Ibid., pp. 5.-7. 
23 Ibid., p. 7. 
24 Ibid., p. 16. 
25 Ibid., p. 7.  
26 Ibid., p. 15.   
27 Cortright and Fairhurst, “Drone Warfare”, p. 12. 
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international humanitarian law, while the use of armed drones in wartime situations are above 
all governed by the use of force law, i.e. ius ad bellum.28 
While the overarching goal for the use of armed drones is to eliminate a threat in act 
of self-defence, there are other advantages of the use of armed drones that have been listed 
and are as follows: diminishing risk of harm to military personnel, capability of drones to 
hover for long period of time to find the right moment for an attack, facilitating the access to 
remote areas, reducing civilian casualties as well as collateral damage [emphasis added]29. 
At the same time, contra to their use, there is some evidence that suggests that law 
enforcement operations and political bargaining have proved to be more effective in 
countering terrorism than military means30, e.g. drone strikes.  
However, the use of armed drones is becoming more common in those states with 
technologically developed military sector. Acknowledging that the use of armed drones has 
become common in fight against terrorism31, it can be derived that they are more often used 
for targeted killings rather than in wartime, i.e. inter-state or intra-state conflicts. One reason 
why their use in practice has become common might be that the use of armed drones in 
counterterrorism operations within the framework of safeguarding global and national 
security concerns is seen as effective military means. The other reason might be that to some 
extent their use at this stage is morally validated by the civic society, informed or 
misinformed, of those countries which use them, even though there are signs of raising 
discontent at the level of international community which might later result in public denial by 
the society at a later stage.32  
The question of the legitimacy of the use of armed drones in counterterrorism 
operation exists independently of the question whether their use in practice receives public 
approval or disapproval. Moreover, their legitimacy shall be discussed under both 
international and domestic law. If we look at the counterterrorism operations as a form of 
countermeasures in response to a wrongful act, then in general those would be considered as 
precluding wrongfulness, thus being legitimate. However, by looking at the specific case of 
targeted killings by any means, the reprisal to an armed attack would be subject to use of 
force law. Therefore, the legitimacy of those attacks could be recognized only subject to very 
particular circumstances in which an armed conflict situation exists and when the persons 
subject to an attack are combatants and can be unmistakably identified as such.     
                                                
28 United Nations. Study on Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Prepared on the Recommendation of the Advisory 
Board on Disarmament Matters, p. vii. Available on: https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/assets/publications/more/drones-study/drones-study.pdf. Accessed May 15, 2019. 
29 Jennifer Welsh, The Morality of “Drone Warfare”, in Drones and the Future of Armed Conflict, ed. by David 
Cortright et al. (London: The University of Chicago Press, 2015), pp. 24-25. See also Bradley Jay Strawser,  
“Moral Predators: The Duty to Employ Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles”, Journal of Military Ethics, vol. 9, no. 4 
(2010): pp. 342-368. 
30 Cortright and Fairhurst, “Drone Warfare”, p. 14. See also Seth G. Jones, Martin C. Libicki, How Terrorist 
Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qa’ida, 2nd ed. (Santa Monica: Rand Publishing, 2008). 
31 Cortright and Fairhurst, “Drone Warfare”, p. 13. 
32 Such discontent is presented through the activities of non-governmental organisations, which have raised their 
concerns over the use of armed drones are American Civil Liberties Union, Open Society Justice Initiative, PAX 
See also United Nations. Discussing Drones at the UN Headquarters. Available on:  
https://www.un.org/disarmament/update/discussing-drones-at-the-un-headquarters-2/. Accessed May 15, 2019. 
Other organisations e.g., International Committee for Robot Arms Control, Human Rights Watch, Mines Action 
Canada, which co-organised the campaign “Stop Killer Robots”, have taken the action one step further by raising 
concern over fully autonomous weapon systems.  
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Acknowledging that armed drones are increasingly used also by the intelligence 
agencies, 33  the question arises, whether their use for intelligence purposes is seen as 
legitimate and in what way it is different from the use of technologies that are usually at the 
disposal of the intelligence forces and would be considered to be of legitimate use in 
achieving their goals? In other words, whether those are any technological specifications of 
armed drones that limits the authority of the intelligence services to use them in secret 
operations? Whether it is the purpose of their use in the hands of intelligence agents which 
render their use illegitimate? Where exactly is the borderline between a secret operation and a 
military operation? Even more, acknowledging that under international law the authority to 
make a decision to perform an armed attack is given to the head of the government,34 then 
how can the use of armed drones by the intelligence services can be interpreted as legitimate 
and what is the legal basis for that under international law? All these questions may inspire 
further clarification of the issue of legitimacy of the use of armed drones under, both 
international and domestic law, and add to the assessment of democratic accountability of the 
use of armed drones, whatever would be the method and situation in which they are 
employed.  
 
Armed Drones Used in Wartime 
The use of armed drones in wartime, i.e. in an armed conflict, can be viewed from the 
perspective of two distinct situations and those are international armed conflicts and non-
international armed conflicts. Within this context the parties to the conflict are the main 
determinants on whether an armed conflict is international or non-international. 35 
Traditionally with international armed conflict would be understood situations in which there 
is established [emphasis added] state of war between two or more states36, whereas the non-
international armed conflict would be understood as a war between a state and a non-state 
actor37. The possible scenarios that correspond to the situation of non-international armed 
conflicts, including within the context of counterterrorism operations carrying out targeted 
killings directed against a single terrorist or a small group of terrorist, will be looked at in the 
following chapter “Armed Drones Used for Targeted Killings”38. 
To continue, the legality of the use of armed drones for military purposes by states is 
not disputed per se.39 In that respect a classical situation of an established armed conflict 
which takes place, if the state of war has been declared between two states or a state and a 
non-state actor, creates no legal problems with regard to the use of armed drones, if they are 
used in accordance with IHL. It is not the technology, but the way it is being used which 
comes at stake when disputing the legality of the use of any type of weaponry. Therefore at 
least with respect to the use of armed drones in counterterrorism operations, what rather often 
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is disputed is whether the requirements for necessity and proportionality under the use of 
force law have been fulfilled and whether the threshold for entering into war as an act of self-
defence has not been lowered too far due to willingness to eliminate potential threats, e.g. 
terrorism.40  
To substantiate the claim made above that the legality of the use of armed drones in 
situations of armed conflict is not disputed, it must be determined under which laws and 
principles their use can be justified. To start, although the term “armed conflict” is not strictly 
defined in Geneva Conventions 1949, a sort of definition is established in Tadić41 case where 
the following definition is provided: 
… an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or 
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between 
such groups within a State.42 
This definition says nothing about the technology used in war therefore there is nothing that 
suggests that remotely piloted aircraft would be excluded from this definition. 
Last but not least, there is a significant difference between the use of armed drones in 
wartime and the use of armed drones outside an armed conflict under IHL according to which 
only combatants or persons directly involved in hostilities could be targeted. In the case of 
established armed conflict the killing could be legal, but in the case of targeted attack carried 
out outside of armed conflict that would be considered a deliberate killing, based on the status 
of combatant,43 but not a targeted one, based on the link to a threat. This distinction is relevant 
to understand why the issue of use of armed drones should be viewed separately in situations 
of armed conflict and outside of armed conflict. However, both deliberate and targeted killing 
does not exclude the possibility to be aimed at reaching the military objective of eliminating a 
threat or defeating an enemy.44 
Armed Drones Used for Targeted Killings 
To start, the author would like to bring clarity on how the targeted killing as an object 
of study can be defined. The definition provided by the Human Rights Council of the United 
Nations (UNHRC) states that  
[a] targeted killing is the intentional, premeditated [emphasis added] and deliberate use of 
lethal force [emphasis added], by States or their agents acting under colour of law, or by an organized 
armed group in armed conflict, against a specific individual [emphasis added] who is not in the 
physical custody of the perpetrator.45 
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Therefore targeted killing in essence is intentional, premeditated, i.e. planned in advance, and 
deliberate use of armed force. However, what is even more important to the definition is that 
is considered to be asymmetrical [emphasis added] use of force, even if the source of 
legitimacy is found at laws governing armed conflicts.46 While to some states targeted killings 
in the global fight against terrorism have become a common method on how to fight injustice 
in act of self-defence, to others the method itself might seem legally unjustifiable, although 
politically supported. It shall also be mentioned that targeted killing can be carried out by all 
kinds of means and does not necessarily involve the use of armed drones, therefore when 
researching the subject in general one should take into account all the possible methods.47 
However, for the purposes of this research only the cases in which a targeted killing has taken 
place within the context of using remotely piloted aircraft by a state, and in particular in 
situations outside of an armed conflict48, shall be viewed. Those are exactly targeted killings 
outside armed conflict situations which face the challenge of legitimacy in particular within 
the context of the international human rights law as the applicable law that makes no 
distinction between the combatants and civilians. 
To continue, the author would like to stress that it is the subject of legitimacy of the 
use of armed drones for targeted killings outside of an armed conflict, that raises controversy, 
rather than the legitimacy of their use in wartime. In that respect the author would like to 
further separately discuss the concepts of, first of all, targeted killing and, secondly, its 
legitimacy, which both follow from the main subject matter, i.e. the use of armed drones.  
It is acknowledged that an individual may become a subject of targeted killing only 
when there is an armed conflict established [emphasis added] and the person can be identified 
as a combatant [emphasis added].49 In all other cases where the necessary link between an 
individual and its participation in an armed conflict cannot be established, a targeted killing 
performed by either armed drones or any other means would not be legitimate. Once a 
targeted killing fails the test of legitimacy it can be considered as extrajudicial killing50 for 
which the responsible persons should be brought to prosecution. 
 The issue of the use of armed drones has gained its significance with the increased use 
of armed drones for targeted killing by one state in another state’s territory within the scope of 
a non-international armed conflict.51 Such practice can take place either with the consent of 
the state on the territory of which the armed drones are being used or on the basis of 
enforcement action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.52 Although states on the territory of 
which the armed drones are being used against non-state actors as an act of self-defence by 
another state for counter-terrorism purposes can give their consent to that state for such 
practices, the resort to force should still take place in accordance with ius ad bellum. 
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Giving an example, the consent to the US to use armed drones for targeted killings in 
another state’s territory has been given by Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia in the recent past.53 
Thereby, since the consent has been legitimately provided, armed drone strikes have satisfied 
the requirement of consent under ius ad bellum. However, for the strike to be fully legitimate 
it must also satisfy the requirements of necessity and proportionality under ius ad bellum.54 
This has been recognized in various International Court of Justice’s judgments, including 
Nicaragua55 where it is determined that there is a “specific rule whereby self-defence would 
warrant only measures which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to 
it”56. The judgment also states that “whether the response to an attack is lawful depends on 
the observance of the criteria of the necessity and the proportionality of the measures taken in 
self-defence”57. Therefore, in the case of the use of armed drones for targeted killing in 
counterterrorism operations the principles of necessity and proportionality shall be taken into 
account and seen in the light of the objective to eliminate the threat to the society in an act of 
self-defence carried out against a single terrorist or a small group of terrorists. To add, the 
legality of such attacks is challenged also on the basis of fact that they are often carried out in 
the zones of non-hostility surrounded by civilians, who should generally be protected by 
IHRL. It is under the IHRL that the bar of the level of protection that must be provided to the 
civilians is raised and under which that protection shall be guaranteed by state military forces 
who conduct targeted killing.  
Finally, another acknowledged problem in relation to targeted killings is the difficulty 
in relation to counterterrorism operations in some cases to draw the line between the military 
leader and the political leader as they are often the same.58 In general targeted killing is 
permissive only if targeted against a military leader, whereas as the political leaders shall be 
protected from such an attack. Even more in cases of counterterrorism operations the status of 
the terrorists and their identity is hard to be identified59, once more raising doubts and 
criticism of the legality of the counterterrorism operations as such. As opposed to targeted 
killing a capture is still the preferred option. However, acknowledging that under the war 
paradigm terrorists are perceived as enemy combatants and therefore are subject to attack, 
targeted killing may be permissible as long as their status is identifiable.60 However, as 
opposed to a combatant actively engaged in war, a terrorist is considered less predictable and 
may also be unlikely to become a subject of capture as that would not eliminate the threat of 
terrorism,61 therefore the standard of imminence as a threshold to attack in practice appears to 
be loosened when it comes to targeting a terrorist. 
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Ethical Issues 
To continue, this chapter shall present the ethical dilemmas that the use of armed drones 
imply. While drones ensure many tactical advantages and add up to reaching strategic goals 
subject to national and international security concerns62, states which use them have been also 
criticized for the lack of transparency and for the non-compliance with the principles of 
necessity and proportionality when making the decision to resort to force by using armed 
drones. Therefore, it is not only within the scope of the discussion on legal issues, but also 
with respect to evaluation of the ethical issues regarding the use of armed drones that the 
principles of necessity and proportionality63 shall be taken into account. For the use of an 
armed drone to be justifiable the targeted killing should be proportional to the collateral 
damage and incidental loss of lives it creates, which can only be assessed within a certain 
legal framework. 
The discussion on the moral issues related with the use of armed drones within the 
scope of this research has a secondary role and follows from the discussion on the legal 
issues. However, the issue of morality from the perspective of legitimacy of one act or 
another serves in itself as the starting point for forming legal principles that would justify the 
use of military technology. Within the scope of this research with the moral challenge is to be 
understood the fact that by using armed drones in wartime, but especially for targeted killing 
in the zones of non-hostility, the risk to do harm to civilians is substantial and at the same 
time is hard to be measured because information on military attacks is not publicly disclosed. 
The question arises whether the advancements in military technology can justify military 
intervention by lowering the threshold for entering into an armed conflict on the basis of the 
assumption that the precision of an attack that can be guaranteed with the technology will 
diminish civilian casualties.64  
Some authors suggest that the moral paradigm of the issue on the development of war 
technology as such can be explained with the reference to just war theory65 and its shift 
towards clean law theory which to some serves as a justification for the use of technological 
advancements in waging war or countering terrorism.66 It has to be stressed here that the right 
to life is one of the inalienable rights and offers a higher level of protection then the IHL 
governing wartime situations.67 The right to life has been explicitly recognized in the ation of 
Human Rights, Article 368, and has also been enshrined in the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), Article 269, safe with the exception that it does not apply in situations 
where the use of force has taken place. From that it can be derived that the right to life is 
limited to self-defence under use of force law.  
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The issue of morality in the time of war is seen within the scope of quantitative and 
qualitative terms. One of the basic tenets of the law on armed conflict determines that, “[t]he 
incidental harm done to civilian individuals and objects must not be excessive in relation to 
the anticipated and direct military advantage that an attack would bring”70. The humanization 
of military attacks in theory is achieved by maximizing the amount of successful attacks and 
reducing the incidental losses as much as possible. Within this context the modern warfare is 
therefore seen as a tool to reach the objective to humanize a military intervention as that 
would render the intervention morally justifiable.71  
Another issue of morality is whether to attack to an individual, whether it would be a 
combatant, a person directly participating in hostilities or an insurgent, by an unmanned 
equipment, i.e. partially automated (or automated in present or in the near future) is 
proportional from a humanitarian perspective. To put it in other words, whether to attack a 
human being with an aim to eliminate the person, even though rightfully, without putting at 
risk the life of the person who is directing the attack, must be seen as immoral because it 
might eliminate the threat to live of national military forces. It is suggested that if the use of 
remotely piloted aircraft becomes a well established practice then in long-term the thinking 
about what is an acceptable method of war and the motivation for an attack also changes. In 
this regard it becomes crucial to distinguish between what is enemy and what is not and how 
to apply the principle of necessity and proportionality when using a remotely piloted aircraft 
in fight against a combatant or a terrorist [emphasis added].   
According to David Cortright (D.Corthright) and Rachel Fairhurst (R.Fairhurst) the 
main ethical question with regard to the subject of the use of armed drones is “whether their 
availability increases the propensity of political leaders to use force?”72. In other words, 
whether the supply determines the demand? While the above mentioned question relates to 
the practical effects of the use of armed drones by military forces, another moral dilemma is 
provided from the political perspective. As put by D.Cortright and R.Fairhurst, the assessment 
of morality shall answer the question “whether the use of drone weapons enhances security 
and prevents terrorist violence?”73 This assessment is primarily related with the assessment of 
effectiveness of such strikes, but in itself also implies the question on what justifies the use of 
force, if the aim behind the policy that authorizes such an act has not been reached. Is it worth 
to continue to execute policy, just or unjust, which does not reach its aim?  
There is empirical evidence available which confirms that disregarding the criticism 
that armed drone strikes are often carried out in zones outside of armed conflicts, therefore 
putting at greater risk the lives of civilians, in reality the number of incidental deaths during 
drone strikes is smaller than by applying conventional methods such as missile attacks or 
attacks on the ground.74  On the other hand what raises concerns of seemingly many 
academics, researchers and human rights activists75 is that the list of individuals subject to 
targeted killing is unknown, primarily for the national and international security reasons in the 
interests of the society.  At the same time, the formation as such of a list for killing would not 
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meet the requirement under the use of force law that for an attack to be legitimate it has to 
respond to an imminent threat.  
To continue, it is suggested, that the moral problem that the use of armed drones 
creates is that the surgical76 approach towards killing by performing the act from a distance 
alienates from the direct consequences of an armed attack. That in turn may result in lowering 
the threshold for the decision to carry out an attack, including in case of targeted killing.77 As 
well put by R.Fairhurst and D.Cortright,  
[d]rone systems partially remove the person from the emotional equation of war, creating a 
vast psychological distance between the launching of a strike and its bloody impact.78 
In opposition to the moral dilemma presented above stands the viewpoint that the possibility 
to perform precise targeted attacks with the help of modern technology such as armed drones 
may help to avoid bloody wars.79 However, such attacks shall still be viewed under the ius ad 
bellum and they still would count as a resort to force, therefore the importance of a decision to 
carry out a targeted killing shall be considered as no less severe, than a decision to carry out 
an armed attack by any other military means. 
Another equally significant ethical question is to what extent the chain of command is 
observed with respect to the use of armed drones by military forces.80 This question requires 
to acknowledge that although armed drones, as used at the moment, might not be fully 
automated, their functioning is partially automated. The sub-question which follows is, 
whether in case the use of armed drones is partially automated, it creates a psychological 
distance significant enough to influence the decision-making of a drone operator.81 Political 
philosopher Alex Leveringhaus tries to find the answers to these questions through the 
following prisms: geographical distance, psychological distance, causal distance and temporal 
distance.82 
To sum up, the perspective of the military forces the technological development of 
weapon systems, including the armed drones, is indispensable for ensuring everlasting or 
ever-growing security of a state83, whereas from the perspective of normative ethics no use of 
force and therefore everything related with its enhancement through technological 
development can ever be justified or moral.  
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ESTABLISHED INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK REGULATING THE 
USE OF ARMED DRONES  
The legal framework governing the use of armed drones in international law is partially set by 
the Charter of the United Nations (UN), but can also be found in the Geneva Conventions 
1949 as well as in international customary law. However, due to the lack of specific 
regulations, the laws and principles governing the use of armed drones are subject to wide 
interpretation.84 Nevertheless in order to fulfill the objectives contained in the UN Charter 
Article 1(1)85 on “maintain[ing] international peace and security” the international community 
asks for increased accountability as well as transparency that can be achieved through 
promotion of existing norms and principles and investigation of the evidenced violations.86 
In parallel to international law, the use of both, unarmed and armed drones, can be 
regulated under the domestic law. However, those regulations are limited to the territory of 
that state, therefore cannot be applicable in case of international or non-international armed 
conflicts, in which case the international law would be applicable. The examples of the US 
and UK, which have formulated their own policies for usage of armed drones and are 
involved in fight against terrorism, will be discussed further below in this research. 
As emphasized in the introductory part and the subsequent chapters of this research 
the three main branches of international law applicable to the use of armed drones are use of 
force law, i.e. ius ad bellum, international humanitarian law and international human rights 
law. It is within this framework that the author will further analyse the concept of legitimacy 
with regard to the use of remotely piloted aircraft, i.e. armed drones, while simultaneously 
trying to find the answer to the research question: “Whether on the basis of the existing 
practice and opinio juris there can be identified the formation of a customary international law 
which authorizes the use of a distinct type of warfare, e.g. armed drones, for anti-terrorism 
purposes against non-state actors in another states territory?”. 
Bearing in mind that the UN is primarily a security organization whose aim is to 
ensure global peace and security, it is also within the UN that a consensus on the future of the 
practices of using armed drones shall be found. With reference to the Resolution adopted by 
the General Assembly on 24 September 2012 known also as the Declaration on the Rule of 
Law87 which reconfirms the “commitment … to an international order based on rule of law”88 
and acknowledging that according to Christof Heyns “the future of global security depends on 
the acceptance of values that are central to the international system …”89 it shall be in the best 
interests of the international society to keep up with their commitments and to come up to a 
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political and legal solution in order to decide on the regulation of the use of both armed and 
unarmed drones in the light of the technological developments.  
The international efforts to establish a common policy in fight against terrorism are 
reflected also in the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy which was first adopted by 
Resolution of General Assembly in 200690 and is reviewed every two years.91 The sixth 
review of the Strategy took place in 2018 with the UNGA’s Resolution adopted on 26 June 
2018.92 The Strategy is based on four pillars as follows:  
1. Addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; 
2. Measures to prevent and combat terrorism; 
3. Measures to build states’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role 
of the United Nations system in that regard; 
4. Measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental 
basis for the fight against terrorism.93 
It focuses on non-military means within the framework of preventive mechanisms to fight 
terrorism, including financial means and enhanced cooperation of international criminal 
police and intelligence agencies.  
Ius ad bellum  
The main legal instrument governing the ius ad bellum is the Charter of the United Nations, 
i.e. the UN Charter law. It sets the basic rules and principles following which the resort to the 
use of force is lawful. The main article of the UN Charter that speaks the use of force is 
Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations, containing within itself a jus 
cogens norm on the prohibition of the use of force, states:  
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the purposes of the United Nations.94 
Since the prohibition to the use of force enshrined in the UN Charter is simultaneously a jus 
cogens norm then at least in theory any derogation from this rule is prohibited.95 However, a 
few exceptions are permissible, which will be the subject of the discussion in the paragraphs 
to follow.  
As the first exception shall be mentioned Chapter VII rule on the use of force, Article 
51 of the Charter of the United Nations96 which speaks on self-defence and states the 
following:  
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Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence [emphasis added] if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security 
[emphasis added]. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be 
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it 
deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security97. 
On the basis of this article the use of force is permitted in the cases of individual or collective 
self-defence in order to guarantee the fulfillment of one of the main aims of the UN Charter 
which is to “maintain international peace and security”. Furthermore, the judgment in 
Nicaragua98 case presents that to act in self-defence is possible only as a response to an armed 
attack, but not of an act of less gravity. This principle is formulated by stipulating that “[..] 
states do not have a right of “collective” armed response to acts which do not constitute an 
“armed attack””99 and in itself presents the principle of proportionality. This of course comes 
at stake when deciding whether an armed attack carried out by an armed drone which is 
piloted by a military personnel or an intelligence agent and directed against an individual 
identified as terrorist is proportional to the attack or threat imposed by that person. 
The other exception to the prohibition of the use of force is provided under the 
Chapter VII rules, Article 39 of the UN Charter, which shall be read in conjunction with 
Article 41 and 42 of the UN Charter and which stipulates that: 
[t]he Security Council [emphasis added] shall determine the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42 [emphasis added], to maintain or 
restore international peace and security.100 
This article authorizes the Security Council to take action which under certain circumstances 
may amount to the use of force. 
In addition to the rules already mentioned in certain instances the treaty law may 
regulate the conditions under which both, unilateral or collective use of force, is permissible 
to the states between which the treaty is concluded. Examples include Cyprus Treaty of 
Guarantee, Franco-Monegasque Treaty or the Constitutive Act of the African Union.101 The 
legal problem arises when those states which have concluded a treaty permitting the use of 
force are at the same time the members of the United Nations and for them under the UN 
Charter law no derogation from the prohibition of the use of force is legally valid except 
under Article 51 or authorization by the Security Council provided in accordance with Article 
39 of the UN Charter. Given that Article 103 of the UN Charter determines the superiority of 
the UN Charter over other international agreements and given the jus cogens character of the 
prohibition to the use of force enshrined also in Article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter, 
there is a reason to object to the validity of any international treaty concluded between the UN 
member states that permits the use of force under any other exceptions except those 
mentioned in the UN Charter.102 
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The final exception to the prohibition of the use of force is the consent of the territorial 
state given to another state to perform an armed attack on its ground against a non-state actor. 
Even though considered to be a legally valid justification for an armed attack, this exception 
is not contained in the UN Charter.103 In the case of the consent the armed conflict would fall 
under the category of non-international armed conflict and would be legitimate as long as it 
would be proportional and necessary to the objective of that attack.104 As already described in 
the introductory part of this article, such a consent for example has been granted to the US by 
Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia105, but also by Nigeria and Iraq in a recent past.106  
This discussion on the validity of the use of force helps to set the framework under 
which the legitimacy of the use of armed drones can be assessed. The important conclusion 
with respect to the ius ad bellum rules is that the legitimacy of the use of armed drones either 
in international or non-international armed conflict depends of variety of elements of 
international law, including the principles of necessity and proportionality, which all serve as 
a basis of state resort to use of force. Additional criterions for legitimacy include the 
following ones: 
[p]recaution requires that, before every attack, armed forces must do everything feasible to: i) 
verify the target is legitimate, (ii) determine what the collateral damage would be and assess necessity 
and proportionality, and (iii) minimize the collateral loss of lives and/or property. AP I, art. 57; ICRC 
Rules 15-21.107  
To sum up, ius ad bellum also referred to as the use of force law primarily defines the 
rules for entry into war. Since wars nowadays are rarely declared and waged between state 
actors only, it has broadened the perspective from which the ius ad bellum rules could be 
viewed. The ius ad bellum rules prescribe the circumstances under which an armed attack is 
permissible between state and non-state actors within the territory of that state which 
performs an attack or within the territory of another state.  
Per definition only armed conflicts between states can be considered international, 
therefore an armed conflict that emerges between a state and a non-state armed group is 
considered to be a non-international armed conflict [emphasis added] subject to the consent 
by the state on the territory of which the attack has been carried out. Since the use of armed 
drones has become a common method for targeting individuals, such as terrorists, in another 
state’s territory108, it has to be acknowledged that in this type of situation the rules on the use 
of force that would usually apply to international, i.e. inter-state conflicts, are not 
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applicable.109 Moreover, there exists the probability that an armed attack using armed drones 
is carried against a non-state actor on another state’s territory without the consent of that state 
where the attack takes place.110 It is the this case that presents an example of additional legal 
problem within the scope of this research.  
First of all, in the case of absence of consent of the state on whose territory an armed 
attack is carried out, there is a probability for such a military activity to be interpreted as an 
attack against that state, even in case the targeted killing is directed against a non-state actor. 
For this reason in the absence of consent of the territorial state such an armed attack by a third 
state could be interpreted as an international conflict and therefore the rules governing 
international conflicts shall equally be applied the same as in armed conflict between states.111  
Last but not least, the distinction between an international armed conflict and non-
international armed conflict is further crucial to determine the applicable rules and principles 
under IHL, but not under use of force law. In general under ius ad bellum an armed attack by 
a one state carried out on the territory of another state against a non-state group without the 
consent of that state, even if it would be necessary and proportional, would not be considered 
as legitimate, but would still be referred to as international armed conflict. Once this 
conclusion is reached other applicable laws and principles shall be viewed. 
 
Necessity and proportionality requirement for self-defence 
It is a basic principle that under the use of force law necessity and proportionality are the two 
requirements that shall be fulfilled in order to exercise the right of self-defence provided by 
Article 51 of the UN Charter.112 These two requirements have been established in customary 
international law through various judgments and advisory opinions given by the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) in the following cases: Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary 
Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America)113, Legality of 
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons114 or Case Concerning Oil Platforms115 (Iran v. United 
States of America).116 Putting a limitation to the right of self-defence the legitimate objective 
of which is to halt an armed attack, these requirements of international customary law bring 
clarity on how to establish the legitimacy of an attack.117 The same criteria of necessity and 
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proportionality hence can be used to establish the legitimacy of the use of armed drones for 
targeted killing both in international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict. 
It is acknowledged that for an attack to be legitimate under the dual requirement of 
proportionality and necessity it must either halt or repel an attack, but not to be punitive. It is 
exactly the risk present when haunting down an enemy such as individual terrorist with the 
means of a remotely piloted aircraft that the nature of such an attack could be punitive.118 In 
practice a targeted [emphasis added] killing against a non-state actor would be carried out 
after an armed attack has already ended, because by definition it is a premeditated response to 
an attack by using lethal force.119 This aspect creates a legal problem within the context of the 
principle of necessity, because in the case of targeted killing the act itself does not serve the 
aim to halt or repel an actual attack, but rather could be described as a strategic move to 
diminish or eliminate a threat from arising in the future [emphasis added].  
The only exception to the compliance with the principles of necessity and 
proportionality of an armed attack, including targeted killing, is found under the pre-emptive 
self-defence doctrine.120 This doctrine provides that a preventive attack can be justified, if 
there is a reasonable difficulty to predict any future attacks of a non-state actor, whereas the 
attack in itself is seen as imminent in the future.121 In order to justify a targeted killing under 
the pre-emptive self-defence doctrine the test of “window of opportunity” is to be applied. In 
essence it means that  
[i]f there is a high risk that unless the person is targeted he will direct and carry out further 
terrorist acts, it may be argued that use of lethal force may be absolutely necessary to protect others 
against those acts.122 
Although there is no widespread support for the doctrine of pre-emptive use of force123 it 
seems to be the only legally valid justification under use of force law for targeted killings.  
Acknowledging that the dynamics of armed conflicts in nowadays may have changed 
because the developed countries are less and less engaged in war on battlefields, the question 
arises what is the threshold between a military activity directed to halt or repel an attack and 
one that is used as a punitive measure. The theory of pre-emptive self-defence doctrine leaves 
open questions. If it is recognized that an anticipatory attack against an imminent threat is 
permissible124, then how can an imminent threat be defined with reference to modern warfare. 
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Another question arises out of the dual principle of necessity and proportionality as 
formulated in the above paragraph, whether to launch an attack can be considered to be aimed 
at halting or repelling also attacks in the future without appearing to be punitive. A 
preliminary answer to this question is that states are only allowed to act in self-defence until 
the actual threat has been eliminated but not to carry out military attacks until complete 
destruction of the enemy is achieved in way that it no longer poses threats in long-term.125 It 
may as well be possible that the same attack is aimed at eliminating an existing threat and to 
diminishing the possibility that a similar threat may arise in the future. 
 
Requirement for consent 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter that prohibits “the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state”126. In essence that means that any use of inter-
state force without the consent given by that state in which the use of force takes place is 
prohibited. There are only two exceptions to this rule established under the UN Charter and it 
is the Article 51 providing rights for self-defence and the Chapter VII giving rights to the 
Security Council to authorize enforcement action 127 , already discussed before. Citing 
judgment in Nicaragua128 case there is no rule in customary international law “permitting the 
exercise of collective self-defence in the absence of a request by the State which is a victim of 
the alleged attack”129. 
 
International Humanitarian Law 
For the international humanitarian law to be applicable there must be an established armed 
conflict either between two different states, i.e. an international armed conflict, or a state and 
an organized non-state armed group, i.e. a non-international armed conflict. It means that 
outside of established armed conflict humanitarian law would not be applicable. The 
establishment of an armed conflict as such is made on the basis of factual and objective 
criteria 130  which under the international humanitarian law are twofold: “the intensity 
[emphasis added] of the conflict and the organization of the parties [emphasis added] to the 
conflict”131. Where the threshold of intensity and organization to establish an armed conflict 
are not met, the international human rights law applies instead, at the same time giving higher 
level of protection.132 In case about doubts on whether the two criteria are met, the threshold 
can be reached also by aggregating the violence that is subject to one single organized armed 
group the level of organization of which can be proved and which is dispersed throughout a 
region, a state or several states, eventually resulting in the application of international 
humanitarian law.133 Nevertheless, the violence cannot be aggregated from different non-state 
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organized armed groups134, therefore, if the level of organization of several armed groups 
cannot be aggregated to one single group, then an armed conflict again cannot be established, 
thus resulting in the application of a higher level of protection of human rights by applying 
the IHRL. This rule applies despite the tendency of the US in particular to broaden the 
definition of what is an organized armed group, i.e. what criteria must be reached for several 
non-state armed groups to be classified as one single armed group, thus applying the lower 
level of protection of human rights, i.e. IHL in a situation of an armed conflict. However, that 
is done disregarding the fact that a non-state organized armed group is to be found on the 
basis of objective criteria and cannot be determined by the attacking state.135  
 Following the establishment of an armed conflict further classification is made with 
regard to the applicable rules and principles that govern both international or a non-
international armed conflict. In both international and non-international conflicts the 
applicable principles for targeting individuals would be as follows: principle of distinction 
[emphasis added]136 and principle of proportionality [emphasis added]137. Under the principle 
of distinction only a civilian taking a direct part in hostilities could be targeted138, but for this 
status to be established a certain well-defined criteria applies again.139 In order to establish 
whether a certain individual is directly participating in hostilities, i.e. exercising a continuous 
combat function140, a threefold test is applied141. According to the test one must, first of all, 
find out whether a certain activity is “likely to adversely affect the military operations or 
military capacity of a party [emphasis added] to an armed conflict”142. Secondly, “[t]here 
must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm [emphasis added]”143. Thirdly, 
“[t]he act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm 
[emphasis added] … (belligerent nexus)”144. With the term “direct cause” is meant a harm 
brought in one causal step.145 Civilians who are indirectly participating in an armed conflict 
through providing weapons or training the personnel would not be considered as legitimate 
targets under the IHL.146 In general, the same applies to those civilians who finance a party to 
an armed conflict or contribute to its continuity in any other form.147 
The establishment of whether an individual is taking direct part in hostilities would be 
crucial when there is a difficulty to establish a direct link between an armed group engaged in 
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an armed conflict and an individual who is performing a combat function. In case such an 
individual considered to be a combatant potentially becomes subject to a targeted killing, then 
under the international humanitarian law it would be necessary to apply the above-mentioned 
test to come to the conclusion whether attacking such an individual would be in line with both 
the principle of distinction and principle of proportionality. 
To continue, the principle of proportionality which is defined under customary 
international humanitarian law, Rule 14, as the “Proportionality to Attack” determines that an 
armed attack causing loss “of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof” 148  that is excessive to the anticipated military advantage, is 
prohibited.149 At the same any loss that is not excessive to a direct military advantage would 
be seen as an incidental loss, including the loss of civilian lives, which is not prohibited.150 
Although there is no specific test applicable to establish whether an attack, including a 
targeted killing, is performed in accordance with the principle of proportionality, the 
interpretation of the customary rule defining the principle provides for several guidelines. 
Firstly, it is provided that the military advantage from an attack should be substantial, 
excluding “advantages which are hardly perceptible and those which would only appear in the 
long term should be disregarded”.151 Secondly, the interpretation of the rule of proportionality 
also provides that decision by the military planners, commanders on whether a concrete attack 
is in line with the principle of proportionality should be reached upon “assessment of the 
information from all sources which is available to them at the relevant time”152. From the 
practical perspective this appears to be reached by engaging advisers, including legal advisers, 
in the decision-making process as military forces alone may lack the knowledge of the legal 
significance of the military decisions they take. Literature suggests that the practice of 
involvement of legal specialists in the chain of command is becoming common for such states 
as US, UK and Israel as well as within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).153  
Finally, it is relevant to stress that the same humanitarian law standards apply 
disregarding whether a certain situation corresponds to an armed conflict between states or a 
state and a non-state armed group and disregarding whether such an armed conflict is 
international or non-international.154 The conclusion which follows from it is that in order for 
the international humanitarian law to apply in relation to targeted killing there must be an 
armed conflict established between a state and a non-state armed group or terrorists. In all 
other situations that could not be considered to fall under the category of an armed conflict the 
legitimacy of a targeted killing would be subjected to a law enforcement activity to which the 
human rights standards would apply.155 The level of protection of both the targeted non-state 
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actors and the civilians under the IHRL would be higher. To conclude, for a targeted killing to 
be legitimate under the IHL, it can only take place within the context of an armed conflict as 
an act which is carried out against an individual in accordance with the principle of distinction 
and which allows to gain direct military advantage which in not excessive to the incidental 
loss caused in accordance with the principle of proportionality. 
 
International Human Rights Law 
Disregarding the fact whether international human rights law (IHRL) applies as lex specialis 
or lex generalis, as a general rule it applies in parallel to IHL.156 Human rights only become 
inapplicable, if they are in conflict with the IHL and principles established by it in a situation 
corresponding to an armed conflict.157 In principle the IHRL in relation to armed conflicts 
applies only as lex specialis,158 but in situations outside an armed conflict the IHRL would 
apply exclusively instead of IHL.159 However, that does not diminish the significance of the 
legal discussion under IHRL of the subject of armed drones used for targeted killings because 
the border line between an armed attack in act of self-defence and a targeted killing is often 
hard to be established. 
The right to life is recognized in the law of treaties and customary law as absolute 
right and under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights no derogations are 
made possible.160 However, the only exception exists when the two following conditions are 
met: there is a threat to life and that threat to life is imminent.161 By definition under the 
human rights law killing is permitted only with an aim to protect the life,162 primarily that of 
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civilians, and only in case if all the other means to achieve this aim have been exhausted.163 
Moreover, since the targeted killing by definition is a preventive step to eliminate an 
individual or a group of individuals, it does not correspond to a permissible killing under the 
human rights law because it is intentional, prearranged and is not a response to an imminent 
threat but rather a response to a persisting threat.164 An example of a border case would be 
that a targeted killing occurs as a response to an imminent threat, but it is less likely that such 
a situation would present itself outside of an armed conflict. Even more, in such a case when 
the targeted killing would be carried out within the context of an armed conflict it would be 
the IHL that would primarily apply.  
 In general outside of an armed conflict in a situation in which the use of force would 
most probably be recognized as a law enforcement activity no person would be eligible to a 
combatant status and therefore a targeted killing by any means the sole aim of which is not to 
protect the life from an imminent threat would be considered to be illegal.165 The sole 
exception would be the law enforcement activities under which the use of lethal force is 
permissible with an aim to protect the life where all other means have been exhausted. In 
comparison to situations of armed conflict in which the IHL would be given priority, in law 
enforcement activities the human rights law applies and overrides the former in importance.166  
 
Multilateral frameworks 
Security Council’s Resolution 1540 (2004) 
The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), unanimously adopted in 2004, 
establishes legal framework for prevention of weapons of mass destruction.167 Although in 
essence its main aim is defined as to limit the threats to international peace and security by 
preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, be them nuclear, chemical or 
biological, it also covers the means of delivery of such weapons.168 The unmanned systems, 
including armed unmanned aerial vehicles, therefore are covered by the resolution 1540 
(2004) within the meaning of means of delivery of such weapons. 169  However, 
                                                
163 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Study on targeted killings, para. 32. 
Available on: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf. 
Accessed April 22, 2018. See also United Nations. Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights 
questions, including alternative approaches for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, A/61/311, paras. 33-45. Available on:  https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/488/01/PDF/N0648801.pdf?OpenElement. Accessed May 15, 2019.  
164 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Study on targeted killings, p. 11., 
para.33. Available on: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf. 
Accessed April 22, 2018. 
165 Ibid., p. 10, para. 30. 
166 Ibid., para. 29.  
167 United Nations Security Council.  Resolution 1540 (2004), Adopted by the Security Council at its 4956th  
meeting, on 28 April 2004, S/RES/1540 (2004). Available on: https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/1540(2004). 
Accessed September 23, 2018. See also Arms Control Association. Igor Khripunov, A work in progress: UN 
Security Resolution 1540 after 10 Years, available on: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014_05/A-Work-in-
Progress-UN-Security-Resolution-After-10-Years. Accessed September 23, 2018. 
168 United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1540 (2004), Adopted by the Security Council at its 4956th  
meeting on 28 April 2004, S/RES/1540 (2004). Available on: https://undocs.org/S/RES/1540(2004). Accessed 
September 23, 2018. 
169 United Nations. Study on Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Prepared on the Recommendation of the 
Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. Available on: https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-
 
29 
acknowledging that the resolution 1540 (2004) does not cover specifically armed drones, its 
effectiveness in creating a legal framework for their use is limited. Although the resolution 
1540 (2004) has been reviewed and its goals reaffirmed by several following UN Security 
Council’s resolutions170, the need for more specific multilateral legal instrument has been 
recognized by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.171 Although as a legal 
instrument that creates binding obligations to all UN member states under Chapter VII172, it is 
a fact that the resolution 1540 (2004) addresses the threat caused by the proliferation of 
unmanned aerial vehicles only implicitly, and does not address the legal validity of the use of 
armed drones by states.  
Wassenaar Arrangement 
The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods 
and Technologies (the Wassenaar Arrangement) 173  was adopted in 1995 and has 42 
participating states.174 It aims at reinforcing the control over the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, including their delivery systems, by a state or a group of states or terrorist 
groups.175 It includes a list of guidelines176 to which the participating states have agreed to 
adhere to as well as the list of dual-use goods177 the proliferation of which shall be prevented 
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and export of which shall be controlled by each participating state through their national 
legislation.178 The Wassenaar Arrangement serves as a good reference point for classification 
of dual-use goods and technologies and also includes a definition of unmanned aerial vehicles 
which is as follows: 
unmanned aerial vehicles, specially designed, modified or equipped for military use including 
electronic warfare, suppression of air defence systems, or reconnaissance missions, as well as systems 
for the control and receiving of information from the unmanned aerial vehicles.179 
Participating states meet regularly at the headquarters of the Wassenaar Arrangement to 
review the list and discuss the continuous implementation process of the goals set by the 
Wassenaar Arrangement through national legal and political instruments. However, its limited 
territorial scope in comparison to the Resolution 1540 (2004) can be considered as a 
disadvantage in reaching the aim of non-proliferation of dual-use goods and technologies not 
only globally but also by the participating states themselves. Instead, the limited list of 
participating states of Wassenaar Arrangement illustrate the willingness of states already 
adhering to international order to cooperate in further precipitating the fight against terrorism 
by constraining the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through export controls. 
Moreover the Wassenaar Arrangement the same as UN Security Council Resolution 1540 
(2004) is exclusively aimed at proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, therefore cannot 
be considered as either validating or invalidating the use of armed drones by states in the fight 
against terrorism. The Wassenaar Arrangement can only be a reference point for 
distinguishing various types of drones and for giving a picture of attempts at international 
level to limit the illegal proliferation of weapons, however it is not directly helpful in 
resolving the question of validity of their use by states, as it covers the validity of certain 
types of conventional arms, dual-use goods and technologies, but not their use for the 
purposes to combating terrorism, including targeted killings outside battlefields.  
EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW 
Acknowledging that the provided international legal framework discussed in previous 
chapters does not bring a clear answer on whether the use of armed drones, also known as 
armed unmanned aerial vehicles, is legal under international codified law, it becomes relevant 
to test whether the use of armed drones against non-state actors could be possibly recognized 
under international customary law. On the basis of this assumption the author will further 
discuss in detail all the elements that could play part in determination of emerging or existing 
international customary law.  
Elements considered in the formation of international customary law 
Traditionally the two main elements considered in the formation of international customary 
law are the state practice and opinio juris.180 The guidelines for identification of customary 
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international law are issued and once more confirmed by the International Law 
Commission181 in 2018. It is generally accepted that the state practice, also known as the 
objective element 182 , to serve as an evidence of existing customary law, must be 
widespread,183 whereas the opinio juris, also known as the subjective element184, although 
relevant in determination of international customary law, subject to the Article 38 and 59 of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, serves as a subsidiary means in its 
determination.185 For the purposes of this research it is relevant to understand what are the 
steps to prove the existence of an international customary law, which might have emerged, 
but has not been codified yet, therefore the author will further focus on the characterization of 
the main elements, i.e. state practice and opinio juris, afterwards discussing their significance 
in the light of fundamental change that might accelerate the formation of a new international 
customary law. 186  Although opinio juris might have only secondary relevance in 
determination of a new customary law, recognizing that the declaration of a new international 
customary law usually takes place through the international adjudication or resolutions with 
crystallizing or declarative effect, is crucial for understanding what are the possibilities of 
emergence of a new customary law to be declared in case there is a lack of widespread 
practice or the practice is known only within a short period of time. 
Since laws are generally made as a reaction to change in circumstances, e.g. 
introduction of new supervisory rules in the light of the growing money-laundering cases in 
the European Union, it is reasonable to assume that international customary law would also 
have to emerge as a reaction to fundamental change of political nature in the status quo of 
states that have resulted in the change of state practices.  
Evidence of uniform state practice 
As a general rule, for a new international customary law to be declared state practice shall not 
only be widespread, but also uniform in its application by various states. By uniform here is 
meant the repetitious nature of practice that is the same or similar in comparison to one 
another, in order for a certain consistency to be established.187 The International Court of 
Justice in its judgments, which in individual cases may be paramount for declaration of a 
customary international law, has referred to the nature of uniform state practice as enough to 
be “sufficiently similar”188 for the purposes of declaration of a new customary law.189 
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Two questions remain subject to interpretation: 1) how many states should apply the 
same practice in order for it to be declared as widespread, and 2) by how much the practices 
of one or several states can differ in order to still declare them as uniform, i.e. what are the 
principles to define similarity of certain practices?  
The conclusion which follows is that in order to establish that a new customary has 
emerged one should look at numerous practices by various states which are sufficiently 
similar leaving the final conclusion subject to interpretation by international tribunals in the 
absence of a UNGA resolution with a declarative effect. 
Existence of opinio juris 
The opinio juris, also known as subjective element, even though being contingent on the 
existence of state practices and therefore playing secondary role in establishing the emergence 
of a customary international law, has nevertheless a determinant role in declaring the 
existence of such a rule.190 The two most important sources of opinio juris would be the 
judgments of international tribunals as an authoritative source and the UNGA resolutions 
adopted by the member states of the United Nations as an expression of the intention of the 
states to abide by a certain rule.191 Whereas, judgments of the international tribunals may be 
definitive and final in declaring the existence of a new rule, therefore binding to all member 
states subject to the tribunal’s jurisdiction, UNGA resolutions might leave larger space for 
interpretation, and the final effect of a certain resolution might be dependent not only on the 
declarative or crystallizing effect of it, but also on the language used, the practices of states 
relied on when adopting it, and the vote outcome that may express the unity of states in giving 
their support to the adoption  of a new international customary rule.  
Ideally in order to reach a conclusion on whether on the basis of the existing opinio 
juris there can be identified the formation of a customary international law the establishment 
of such a rule would be based on a judgment of an international tribunal or a UNGA 
resolution which has a declarative effect, clear language and majority vote outcome. 
Following the research question, in order to establish the existence of an international 
customary law, which authorizes the use of a distinct type of warfare, e.g. armed drones, for 
anti-terrorism purposes against non-state actors in another states territory, one should find a 
sufficiently determinant judgment of an international court or base the conclusion on the 
UNGA resolutions in a short or extended period of time. 
In this particular case it may also be relevant that at least at the moment such a rule 
may not be accepted by all the member states of the United Nations neither to be declared to 
be applicable to all the member states. Rather only to those which possess the technology192 
or which are already involved in the practices of the use of armed drones for counter-
terrorism purposes, both from the perspective of attacking states and the states on whose 
territory the attacks have been carried out. Although the possibility to localize an international 
customary rule also remains subject to interpretation in case a customary international rule the 
existence of which would be determined by the practices of a few states would then become 
abiding to the international community as a whole.193  
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Accelerated formation  
Accelerated formation of international customary law may refer to “international 
constitutional moment” or “Grotian moment”194. While both refer to fundamental change in 
circumstances that may trigger the creation of a new rule, the former is more suitable to 
describe constitutional developments, whereas the latter would more likely refer to 
transformation of an international law in general, including creation of a new international 
customary law.195  
Short time-frame and few practices 
A few examples of accelerated formation of international customary law are known in the 
history of international law which could be recognized as “Grotian Moment”196.197 Among 
these examples is the formation of outer space law in the form of the “Declaration of Legal 
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space” 
adopted by the UNGA 198 . The other example is the formation of the principle of 
“Responsibility to Protect” as a response to humanitarian crises following the NATO 
intervention in 1999 in Serbia to eliminate the possibility of a Kosovar Albanian genocide to 
take place.199 Last but not least, another example of an accelerated formation of customary 
law is the crystallization of concept of individual criminal responsibility during the 
Nuremberg trials, making individuals the subjects of international criminal law in comparison 
of states being the only subjects as it was prior to the Nuremberg trials.200 From the concept of 
individual criminal responsibility later the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise (JCE) was 
elaborated.201  
Role of General Assembly resolutions 
Along the judgments of international tribunals, UNGA resolutions are the next authoritative 
source for determining the emergence or existence of a new international customary rule.202 
While being an authoritative source, UNGA resolutions may have declarative or crystallizing 
effect with respect to the formation of international law, bringing different results. At the 
same time, the language used [emphasis added] in a resolution and the vote outcome 
[emphasis added]203 for a resolution may also have an effect in determining the degree of 
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authority of a certain resolution, respectively having higher or lower impact on declaring or 
crystallizing the emergence of a new rule. All of these elements will be in short described in 
the following chapters. 
Declarative or crystallizing effect 
As already mentioned, there are two types of UNGA resolutions that may most likely help to 
determine the emergence of a new international customary rule – resolutions with declarative 
and crystallizing effect. While the former may sound as having affirmative character, the 
latter might be less assertive depending on the circumstances in which the resolution is 
adopted. It is known that historically the crystallization of new customary norm has in most of 
the cases taken decades,204 whereas UNGA resolutions may have an instant impact on 
crystallization or declaration of an emergent rule.205 Sources also refer to the theory of 
“instant custom”, on the basis of which a new international customary rule would be 
established instantly after a majority vote of a resolution206, however this theory meets with 
criticism207. While the line between both, resolution with a declarative and with a crystallizing 
effect, might be blurry and most likely would depend on the language used, it is important to 
keep in mind that, in general, since the UNGA is vested only with the power to 
recommend208, then both types of resolutions most likely will not be able to generate a new 
international customary law. 
Nevertheless, in the case the existence or emergence of a new customary norm of 
international law cannot be confirmed on the basis of judgments issued by international 
tribunals or Security Council resolutions, which are binding to all United Nations member 
states209, then the UNGA resolutions with a declarative or crystallizing effect might be used 
as a source of affirmation that a new rule is emerging. However, these resolutions alone 
would not be sufficient to determine the existence of a new rule210 and therefore the legal 
validity of certain activities, e.g. the use of armed drones for counter-terrorism purposes, only 
on the basis of those resolutions could not be established. 
Vote outcome 
The vote outcome might result in unanimous vote, majority vote or minority vote. While the 
minority vote would unlikely serve as a basis to crystallize an emergent rule, a unanimous or 
majority vote could have an effect in defining the emergence of a new international customary 
law. 211  However, not only the quantitative element, but also the qualitative element, 
understood as the reasoning behind the vote,212 can be taken into account when assessing the 
law-generating effect of a resolution. E.g., some votes might be purely formal, done to avoid 
                                                
204 Scharf, “Accelerated Formation of Customary International Law”, p. 306 
205 Ibid., p. 326. 
206 Ibid., p. 324. See also South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 6. Khurshi Iqbal, 
The Right to Development in International Law: The Case of Pakistan 120 (2010), dissenting opinion in the 
South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa), 1966 I.C.J. Rep. paras. 248, 291-293. 
207 Scharf, “Accelerated Formation of Customary International Law”, pp. 324-326. 
208 Ibid., p. 324. 
209 United Nations. United Nations Charter, arts. 10-11. 
210 Scharf, “Accelerated Formation of Customary International Law”, p. 326. See also Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, 
“Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation”, American Journal of 
International Law Vol 95 (2001) 95: p. 757, accessed May 21, 2018, https://doi.org/10.2307/2674625.  
211 Scharf, “Accelerated Formation of Customary International Law”, p. 327. 
212 Ibid., pp. 325-327. 
35 
braking consensus or to keep with the former practices, the same as in case of some 
resolutions state may choose to object or abstain from voting.213 Therefore the vote outcome  
similarly as other elements playing part in the determination of emergence of new customary 
rule cannot be taken into account isolated from other objective and subjective elements. 
Language 
When assessing the impact of a certain UNGA’s resolution on the determination of an 
emerging customary rule, the language is another element that plays part, but at the same 
proportionally to other elements, including objective ones, is relatively insignificant. One 
reason for this is that in order to reach consensus, the language is stretched and generalized to 
the maximum. Another reason is that the language used in resolutions might be far-fetched 
from reality, i.e., not directly related to practices of states.214 
PRACTICES ON THE USE OF ARMED DRONES  
The practices of states which will be in brief described in the following chapters cannot 
provide a full picture of all the attacks by armed drones carried out against non-state actors in 
another states territory for counter-terrorism purposes by each state. The practices chosen 
demonstrate the pattern which is continuously evolving, but is not yet known to be 
determined as a practice that would have emerged into a new customary international law, 
eventually allowing these attacks to be affirmed as legally valid under international law. 
United States 
Actions taken against non-state actors 
The first instrument that can be interpreted as allowing the use armed drones for counter-
terrorism purposes in the US is the Joint Resolution on the Authorization to Use Military 
Force by the US Congress215 which was adopted shortly after the 9/11 attacks in the territory 
if the US by terrorist group al-Qaeda.216 Although it does not directly mention the use of 
armed drones or any other particular military methods, it contains authorization of a broad 
scope, giving the permission “to use all necessary and appropriate force”217 in exercising 
rights of self-defence, an authorization under which also the use of armed drones can easily 
fall.  
Since then the US have gradually expanded the use of armed drones for targeted 
killings as a lethal force against non-state actors within the context of counterterrorism 
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operations, for the most part engaging the use of armed drones in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
However, the first known use of remotely piloted aircraft, i.e. armed drone, by the US for the 
purposes of targeted killing as a response to 9/11 attacks took place on 3 November 2002 in 
Yemen killing one of the al-Qaeda leaders.218  
Apart from the fact that US have carried out attacks for counterterrorism purposes 
against non-state actors in the territories of another states, it is also important to acknowledge 
the difference between those cases when the authorization of the state on whose territory the 
attacks were carried out was not given and those cases in which the authorization by the state 
was actually given. Among such states have been Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia.219 However, 
in case of Pakistan and Yemen, there is evidence that both of these countries withdraw their 
consent later. Pakistan did it in spring 2012 following a parliamentary vote.220 Following this 
decision by Pakistan, however, the US kept carrying out armed drone attacks on the territory 
of Pakistan.221 Similarly Yemen denounced its consent for the US military using armed 
drones on their territory at the end of 2013 by adopting a resolution that pronounced a halt to 
drone strikes.222  
Opinio juris 
In finding any evidence of the existence of opinio juris that would support the practice to use 
armed drones in the fight against terrorism targeting non-state actors in another state’s 
territory, the author focused on the possibility to find available decisions or judgments on the 
subject issued by international tribunals and the UNGA resolutions concerning the fight 
against terrorism or the use of armed drones specifically. 
In short, the author concluded that there is no case law available at the moment issued 
by any of the international tribunals or the International Court of Justice, that would adjudge 
the legality of the use of armed drones for targeted killings or mention the possibility of 
emerged international customary law with regard such practices. However, there have been 
several attempts to challenge the US drones strikes in courts at national level, e.g., in 
Pakistan223, UK224 and the US225 itself. In case of the judgment issued by the High Court of 
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Pakistan, the court declared that the practices of the US to carry out drone strikes in the 
territory of Pakistan are illegal under international law, whereas in the cases brought before 
the courts of UK and US, in the former the claim was rejected on the basis of the lack of 
jurisdiction, and in the latter the claim was dismissed on the basis of political question 
doctrine. 
The most recent court proceedings in which the US drone strikes have been 
challenged at national level concern two cases brought at the Higher Administrative Court of 
North Rhine-Westphalia in Münster, Germany.226 Although these two recent cases are not 
brought before an international tribunal either, the author would like to use them for the 
purposes of this research to stress the significance of the subject and the fact that there can be 
seen an ongoing search of the ways how to make the US responsible for the drone strikes it 
has carried out over the years. While the previously mentioned cases did not bring any 
significant repercussions to the US, in the two ongoing case brought before the court in 
Germany the result is yet unknown.  In both cases brought before the German court, the US 
armed drone program launched from the military base Ramstein Air Base located in the 
territory of Germany has been challenged. In one case a plaintiff challenges the program 
carried out in the Middle East, Yemen, and in the other case another plaintiff is challenging 
the program carried out in East Africa, namely Somalia.227 In comparison to the previously 
recorded cases in which the US drone strikes were challenged, in the case of Yemen there is a 
reason to believe that the plaintiffs might have taken significant steps in trying to establish the 
causal link between the victims, the air base from which the armed drones were launched and 
the pilots who control the systems remotely, including on the basis of data transfers.228   
When taking a look at the UNGA resolutions on the subject, the author did not find 
resolutions condemning the use of armed drones for the purpose of targeted  killings by the 
US. However, one of the most relevant resolution found regarding the subject is the UNGA  
resolution A/RES/60/288229 by which the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy 
was adopted by consensus in 2006, is reviewed every two years, and consists of four pillars as 
follows: 1) Addressing the Conditions Conducive to the Spread of Terrorism; 2) Preventing 
and Combatting Terrorism; 3) Building States’ capacity and strengthening the role of the 
United Nations; 4) Ensuring Human rights and the rule of law230. The annex of the UNGA 
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resolution A/RES/60/288 contains a plan of action and its second section, i.e. the second pillar 
of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy lays down measures to prevent and combat 
terrorism. The last review of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted by the 
UNGA’s resolution A/RES/72/284231 on 26 June 2018, which among other states that 
[r]ecognizing hat international cooperation and any measures taken by Member States to 
prevent and combat terrorism, as well as to prevent violent extremism as and when conducive to 
terrorism, must fully comply with their obligations under international law, including the Charter, in 
particular the purposes and principles thereof, and relevant international conventions and protocols, in 
particular human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law.232 
The author would like to stress that according to this review of the Global Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy it can be once more ascertained that no matter what measures are taken by states to 
combat or  prevent terrorism, they should all comply with the international law, including and 
in particular international human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law. 
Finally, although it may not count as opinio juris, the following commentary is 
relevant to demonstrate the stance of the US in a generalized manner. It is suggested by a 
former Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) director John Brennan, that  
[t]here is nothing in international law that bans the use of remotely piloted aircraft … or 
prohibits us from using lethal force against our enemies outside of an active battlefield.233  
However, this statement runs against the limitations on the use of force under the use of force 
law. Nevertheless, the US Government justifies the right to perform targeted killings with the 
right to self-defence under the use of force law, assuming that the US is or has been involved 
in an armed conflict with the terrorist organizations on the basis of international humanitarian 
law according to which terrorists would be unlawful combatants if the criteria for an 
international armed conflict are fulfilled.234  
Disregarding of the examples demonstrated that speak on the counter-terrorism and 
the use of armed drones, it must be concluded that there is a lack of opinio juris, that would 
directly address the issue of US armed drones strikes for counter-terrorism purposes carried 
out in another states territory on the basis of which it could be concluded that due to the 
practices of the US a new customary international law has emerged that renders such 
activities legal. Rather there is new evidence on stronger response from the international 
community which demonstrates objection to these practices and search alternative, 
comprehensive and more sophisticated methods of countering terrorism.  
Response from the international community 
Disregarding the conclusion already made in the previous chapter the author would like to 
further the discussion by stressing that the US fight against terrorism shall be put under 
scrutiny once more by paying attention to the fact that it has evolved from the fight against al-
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Qaeda. The initial motivation to carry out attacks has been born from circumstances of 
heightened pressure as an act of self-defence against one particular terrorist organization. The 
end result seems to be that it has become a practice of the US to use armed drones in fight 
against various non-state actors, i.e. terrorist organizations, in another states territory long 
after the actual events due to which the practice emerged have taken place. In these situations 
the threat is no longer imminent, therefore such attacks cannot be considered as to be carried 
out in self-defence, but rather adopted as a preventive practice. 
In the years following the 9/11 attacks there has been a tendency by the US to put the 
organized groups of terrorists or associated forces under the label of al-Qaeda, therefore 
claiming that on the basis of aggravated violence and sufficient level of organization 
[emphasis added] there are reasonable grounds to attack the terrorist groups235. Research 
shows that the US has failed to distinguish between actual terrorist organizations and the 
many insurgent groups that are active in the regions where the counterterrorism operations 
have been carried out, including Yemen and Pakistan. As a result combatants not directly 
involved in any form of armed conflict might have been killed during the anti-terrorism 
operations by using armed drones.236  Later on there has been a tendency to do the same with 
regard to the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, i.e. ISIS.237 
Even more, the practice of the US shows that the standard of imminence established 
under the use of force law has been replaced by the standard of probability238, thereby 
attempting to justify targeted killing with the use of remotely piloted aircraft, i.e. armed 
drones in another states territory. Such a change in the standard creates both legal and moral 
problem in justifying the attacks. Acknowledging that killing as a post factum act cannot be 
justified either under use of force law or under international humanitarian law239, the only 
standard according to which the act would be legitimate is the standard of imminence. 
The concern brought up by some authors is the risk that within the decision-making 
process on whether a targeted killing shall be carried out concepts such as “imminence” and 
legal target in accordance with the principle of distinction, are interpreted too broadly.240 As a 
result legitimizing an attack that would otherwise be seen as disproportional to the military 
advantage it was aiming at and also the threat faced by the US. 
 
United Kingdom  
Actions taken against non-state actors 
The practices of the UK to use armed drones in countering terrorism seem to be less 
controversial than the ones of the US or at least less heard. According to the officially 
released information by the Ministry of Defence of the UK, some drones, both armed and 
unarmed have been deployed in Afghanistan over the years and used mostly for the 
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intelligence purposes to support the military forces on the ground.241 Similarly military drones 
have been deployed in Iraq and Syria in an effort to support the fight against Daesh.242 
However, more precise information on the deployment of armed drones and the purposes for 
their use are not made known publicly subject to the duty not to disclose military information 
due to security concerns.243 
Even though in most of the cases the UK practices the use of drones for intelligence 
purposes by supporting ground forces, there is an occasion of the use of armed drones for 
counter-terrorism purposes which should be brought to the attention. It is the drone strike of 
21 August 2015 in which the UK targeted an Islamist terrorist Reyaad Khan, a British citizen, 
and two other his associates in Syria, as confirmed by the statement of 7 September 2015 of 
the Prime Minister of the UK at that time, Mr. David Cameron.244 This targeted attack with 
the use of armed drone was the first time known that the UK carried out a targeted drone 
strike outside of an armed conflict in another states territory without being engaged in war 
with that country, i.e. outside of armed conflict.245 However, until today there are no known 
cases of repetitious drone strikes as the one targeted against the Islamist terrorist. 
 
Opinio juris 
When looking at the possible judgments of international tribunals, also in the case of UK 
there are no known accounts of proceedings brought at international level. One of the reasons 
could be the fact that in the known cases against the practices of armed drones used for 
targeted killings the plaintiffs are individuals, which are not subjects under international law. 
For the case to be brought to an international tribunal the parties should traditionally be states, 
but definitely not individuals. Until the dispute on the use of armed drones for targeted 
killings does not arise between two states, it is unlikely that the emergence of a new 
customary international rule would be established on the basis of case law , since judgments 
issued by national courts could only serve as a reference point for interpretation purposes, but 
would not become binding internationally. 
However, it can be mentioned here that there is a case246, brought in the national 
courts of the UK, in which a drone strike has been challenged. The case The Queen on The 
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Application of Noor Khan v. The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
was brought to the High Court of the UK in 2012.247 The plaintiff was challenging the drone 
strike in Pakistan allegedly carried out by US military forces on the basis of the intelligence 
provided by the UK’s drones within the scope of a coalition operation, which resulted in the 
death of the plaintiff’s father. Unfortunately, substantive interpretation for the purposes of 
supporting the theory of an emerging international customary law could not be found within 
the judgment, since it the British High Court rejected it on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. 
To continue, following the first known armed drone attack within the scope of 
counterterrorism operation carried out by the UK on 21 August 2015, soon after in May 2016 
the UK’s policy on the use of armed drones was published248, including the determination of 
the rules and principles for carrying out targeted killings abroad, i.e. in international conflicts, 
in non-conflict zones. The “new departure” 249  that illustrates a change in the UK’s 
government military strategy to counter terrorism at the same time serves as an example to 
show that the political choices at times may supersede the law regulating the area in the 
interests of the public. Even though, a national policy the same as judgments made by 
national courts, cannot determine the emergence of an international customary law, such 
policy can clearly serve as an evidence of the change of paradigm of practices on the use of 
military force by a state. What the government clearly stressed soon after the performed drone 
strikes was that the attack was absolutely necessary and proportionate in the face of threats 
imposed, and carried out as a response to an imminent threat.250  
Even more, the drone strike led by the UK against Reyaad Khan in Syria on 21 August 
2016 according to the Prime Minister “… was not a part of coalition military action against 
ISIL in Syria; it was a targeted strike to deal with a clear, credible and specific terrorist attack 
to our country at home.”251 From this statement it could already be derived that from the 
perspective of the government of the UK there was and is a difference between a targeted 
drone strike and an ordinary military action. Whereas the theory suggests that the use of 
armed drones should comply with both the ius ad bellum and IHL from which follows that the 
use of armed drones cannot be governed by different principles than any other military 
activity notwithstanding the type of target or the territory where the attack takes place. On this 
account the political statement that armed drone strike has not been part of a military action 
does not justify the use of armed drones in accordance with principles of necessity, 
proportionality and consent under ius ad bellum and principles governed by international 
humanitarian law.  
                                                
247 Case “The Queen on the application of Noor Khan v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs”. 
248 Parliament of the United Kingdom.  The Governments policy on the use of drones for targeted killings, 
available on: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201516/jtselect/jtrights/574/574.pdf.  Accessed March 25, 
2018.  
249 Parliament of the United Kingdom. House of Commons. Statement by the Prime Minister on Syria: Refugees 
and counter-terrorism, Column 30, available on: 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmhansrd/cm150907/debtext/150907-
0001.htm#1509074000002. Accessed May 18, 2019. 
250 Ibid., Column 25.  
251 Parliament of the United Kingdom.  The Governments policy on the use of drones for targeted killings. 
Available on: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201516/jtselect/jtrights/574/57405.htm#_idTextAnchor014. 
Accessed March 25, 2018. See also Parliament of the United Kingdom. House of Commons. Statement by the 
Prime Minister on Syria: Refugees and counter-terrorism, Column 30, available on: 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmhansrd/cm150907/debtext/150907-
0001.htm#1509074000002. Accessed March 25, 2018. 
42 
Moreover a report by the Ministry of Defence of the UK suggested that the incentive 
to justify certain military operations abroad had been based on availability of armed drones as 
it can eliminate the threat to the military personnel and add to the achievement of national 
security goals.252 From that it can be derived that the moral justification for the decision to use 
armed drone in military operations was twofold, to reduce the risk to the military personnel 
and to reduce the incidental loss or harm to the civilian population by performing precise 
attacks to listed individuals.   
Another subject for debate in the UK is the authority to give a decision to use force on 
another state’s territory. Under international law such an authority may only be given to the 
head of the government, which in the case of the UK is the prime minister, and even then only 
if there is a situation of an armed conflict.253 Recognizing that the UK has been and still is  
involved in counterterrorism operations abroad and is also a frequent ally of the US in 
facilitating attacks, the debate on the authority of the decision to employ forces or perform an 
attack by using armed drones is crucial within the UK more from both the political 
perspective and from the legal one. There is a debate in the UK already since 2003 that the 
power to make a decision to deploy armed forces could be partially passed to the parliament 
of the UK.254 One limitation to such a rule that appears self-evident is that an armed attack as 
a response to an imminent threat shall be carried out instantly, therefore leaving no room for 
parliamentary debate. So far this initiative has not received support and the reform has not 
taken place. 
All of the opinions and discussion mentioned in the paragraphs above are sources or 
evidence of formation of national policies in the UK with regard the use of armed drones and 
the counterterrorism activities in general. Although there is not a sufficient degree of certainty 
established that could affect the formation of an international customary law with respect of 
targeted killings, the vivid debate and policy documents available on national level 
demonstrate the importance of subject and provides varying interpretations for justification of 
targeted killings outside an armed conflict. 
 
Response from the international community 
In the case of the UK there has not been significant response from the international 
community with respect to the one occasion of a targeted killing. It could be explained with 
the fact that right after the attack the UK itself came up with a public statement, explaining 
the process, started the investigation procedures following the proposal from the 
government,255 and came up with several reports made by the respective authorities. Whereas 
with respect to the use of military drones for counterterrorism purposes providing intelligence 
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support, the highlight has been the case brought in court by a Pakistani national in relation to 
the military drone providing supportive intelligence information as part of coalition operation. 
In general, the procedures during and following the use of military drones by the UK seem to 
be quite transparent, as much as the situation allows, and therefore there has not been 
observed a relevant response from the international community. 
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CONCLUSION   
Within the scope of the subject of the use of armed drones for counterterrorism purposes, the 
balance is to be found between the national security objectives of individual states and the 
state liability under international law. While from the perspective of the military objectives in 
relation to state security concerns the technological development of weapon systems, 
including the armed drones, is indispensable for ensuring everlasting or ever-growing security 
of a state256, from the perspective of normative ethics no use of force and therefore everything 
related with its enhancement through technological development can ever be morally 
justifiable. 
The use of armed drones under the existing ius ad bellum, IHL and IHRL, can only be 
justified within the scope of established armed conflict, but not outside of an armed conflict. 
The ius ad bellum determines that an armed attack must meet the threshold of necessity and 
proportionality to count as legitimate, and limits the use of force by states on another states 
territory, except in the case of consent. The only exception to the compliance with the 
principles of necessity and proportionality of an armed attack, including targeted killing, 
under ius ad bellum, can be found under the pre-emptive self-defence doctrine in case of an 
imminent threat in the future. Whereas, for a targeted killing to be legitimate under the IHL, it 
can only take place within the context of an armed conflict as an act which is carried out 
against an individual in accordance with the principle of distinction and which is not 
excessive to the incidental loss caused in accordance with the principle of proportionality. 
Finally, IHRL would apply only in situations outside of an armed conflict. 
On the basis of the existing practices and opinio juris it cannot be established that the 
use of armed drones for counter-terrorism purposes has emerged into a customary 
international rule, which would authorize the use of a distinct type of warfare, e.g. armed 
drones, against non-state actors in another state’s territory. In the case of the US the use of 
drones is relatively common, however there is lack of transparency subject to duty not to 
disclose military information. Whereas in the case of UK, the practice has been carried out 
only once, but has instigated a public debate, providing a lot of potential sources for 
interpretation of the issue that could also amount to opinio iuris. Although this evidence of 
practices and opinio juris of both states alone accumulated together could serve as a basis of 
formulating new international customary law, viewed separately within the context of the 
national policies of each state, it is not possible to establish a new rule. 
At the level of the UN, the emergence of a new international customary law on the use 
of armed drones has not been established, however a process of formulating the Global 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy is ongoing for more than 10 years. However, at this stage the 
formulation of principles and rules in fight against terrorism, in particular the use of armed 
drones for targeted killings, has not resulted in the formulation of a new customary 
international law. Rather the former practices to use armed drones for counter-terrorism are 
continuing, while more and more states and also non-state actors are acquiring in their  
possession armed drones, therefore even more increasing the need for a regulatory 
framework, that would reformulate the basic principles of ius ad bellum and IHRL, 
corresponding to today’s needs. 
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